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Abstract

The evolution of networks into more distributed, self-reliant nodes has mitigated single-point
failures that plagued traditional centralized networks. Applied to power grids, distributed
systems can increase the integrity and availability of grid services while also offering a power
management solution. However, while distributed networks provide scalability, security, and
sustainability compared to centralized networks, their distributed nature makes them harder
for anomaly detection and prevention. Incorporating a Distributed Trust Model (DTM)
System into an Energy Grid of Things Distributed Energy Resource Management System
(EGOT DERMS) allows grid participants to be characterized and their communication to be
analyzed for possible attacks. A Trust Model simulator is needed to evaluate and improve
the DTM System.
Trustworthiness is calculated using a Trust Model. While many trust models exist,
most only consider 2-3 matrices to evaluate trust. The TM proposed in this thesis uses a
Metric Vector of Trust (MVoT) monitoring 17 parameters when assessing trust. Moreover,
unlike standard trust models, the proposed trust model establishes a method to test the
trust between various actors within the network and probe the trust model itself. Using a
Trust Model Simulator, MVoT calaculations, initial values, and parameters are fine-tuned to
achieve high-confidence message classifications and minimize false positives. The DTM
System and Trust Mode Simulation Suite allow for distributed trust evaluation with a reali

time classification of EGOT DERMS actors, providing additional security for distributed
systems.
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1 Introduction

With the exponential increase in computing performance, simulators and simulation frameworks have been the go-to avenue for cost-effective and time-efficient testing methods for
calculations and parameters. While a plethora of simulators promise simulation on trust
between entities, none have demonstrated the ability to simulate the trust model itself [1],[2].
Current implementations aim at showcasing the result of introducing a trust model to an
existing network but shy away from discussing the integrity and rigidity of the trust model
itself [3]. Moreover, traditional trust model simulation research often ignores a key importance of simulators, which is highlighting flaws in calculations, design, or implementation. A
problem arises when discussing how one can evaluate a trust model and associated equations
for correction and improvement. Therefore, a trust model simulator that allows for the
trust model itself to be simulated while also displaying the potential issues in its design is
valuable.
Similar to the concept of trust between humans, networks are starting to utilize trustbased interactions for data handling. While the concept of trust has been extensively
studied in the context of social science and philosophy, in computing, trust remains a
relatively new concept [4]. When discussing trust in the digital realm, the definition is
not as forthright. Digital trust has various parameters and changes with respect to context,
content, and reputation [5]. Whether a Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), Peer-to-Peer
1

(P2P) networks, overlay networks, or ad-hoc networks, data transaction between nodes relies
on trust to distinguish between benevolent and malicious actors. Moreover, access control
and privileges are directly affected by the trust values associated with an actor; thus, good
behavior is rewarded while bad behavior is punished throughout the network.
As the concept of distributed and ad-hoc networks gains popularity, there have been
numerous attempts at modeling the trust between actors [6],[7]. While these simulators do a
great job simulating the overall network interactions between the various actors, they lack in
quantifying trust evolution through the network. Our MVoT-based distributed TMS allows
for the interworking of the network to be simulated while also evaluating trust for all the
participating actors.
Simulation models can be designed to closely mimic real-world environments, guiding
engineers to alternative methods that would be better suited for their desired application.
Said simulation models can use various parameters, variables, equations, and initial values
to make a simulation abide by any set of desired constraints. Some of these parameters
include registration time and time step, while some of these variables include time since
last communication, communication frequency, trust score, and certainty. Our goal with the
aforementioned parameters and variables is to arrive at a numerical way of representing the
concept of trust between computers and actors and to provide a method of benchmarking
the trust model itself.
While the proposed trust model simulator can be applied to various fields and applications, our current implementation tests the Trust Model (TM) within an EGoT DERMS.

2

The current implementation is incorporated in the , a compulsory module within the overall
system. The main goal of the is to augment existing security within an EGoT DERMS by
monitoring exchanged messages and energy requests between the various system actors.
Calculations, initial values, and alert thresholds were tested by leveraging the TMS within
an EGoT DERMS.
The structure for the remainder of this paper is as follows: Chapter 2 is a background of
simulators and Trust Models. Chapter 3 discusses the Energy Grid pertaining to Distributed
Energy Resource Management Systems. Chapter 4 is the software decisions and implementations. Chapter 5 is the experimental setup for DTM Simulation Suit. Chapter 6 discusses
the results of the DTM Simulation Suite, and Chapter 7 is the conclusion.

3

2 Background

While trust is easily defined when applied to humans and their interactions, the definition is
not as clear when discussing devices and machines on a network. Trust in computing is very
field-dependent. Whether in data provenance, semantic web, cloud, or mobile computing,
the notion of trust is different [4]. Due to the wide variance of areas relying on trust, it is
common to find field-specific simulators aiming to simulate the trust between the active
devices within a network or organization.
With the explosion of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and their applications, IoT devices
have become very lucrative targets for attackers. Due to the relatively large attack surface
and inherently weak built-in security of IoT networks, security researchers have shed light on
the threats and vulnerabilities associated with IoT networks [8, 9, 10, 11]. One mechanism to
improve the overall security of an IoT network is by adding a trust element and an evaluating
authority. By incorporating trust, the pre-existing security can be heightened and augmented
to provide the end-users and the infrastructure more security and privacy.
P2P networks has been simulated to showcase the effect malicious nodes has on performance.
A popular unstructured P2P network simulator is GIAnduia (GIA). GIA is a simulation
environment based on OverSim, an open-source framework based on OMNeT++. GIA uses
three main matrices to evaluate performance: Satisfaction Level, Hop Count, and Search

4

Bandwidth Consumption. By incorporating satisfaction level in the evaluation process, GIA
assigns a satisfaction value to each participating peer that ranges between 0 and 1, with
values close to 0 representing an unsatisfactory peer and values close to 1 representing a
satisfactory peer. Based on the satisfaction level, the simulation aims at reconfiguring peers
to connect with peers who have the highest satisfaction level. Regarding hop count, the
simulation measures the distance (or the number of hops) between the source and destination
nodes. Finally, the inclusion of search bandwidth consumption allows the simulator to
measure the amount of traffic generated by a peer’s request. Leveraging the three matrices,
GIA restricts malicious nodes from participating in a P2P network and increases the overall
network performance [12]. Although the three matrices used by GIA may be considered
sufficient at showcasing overlay network improvements, the matrices remain limited in
scope. While it was enough to show a performance increase after including a trust-based
mechanism, its evaluation is not dynamic enough to provide a real-time assessment of the
trust between the peers within the observed network.
WSN have also been simulated using TRMSim-WSN to understand better the evolution of
trust and reputation for Wireless Sensor Networks. TRMSim-WSN leverages the Unified
Trust Model (UTM) [13] to perform its trust evaluation. UTM consists of five main layers.
It starts by gaining information about the participating sensors, what they offer and what
they can request. Based on the information it acquires, the model creates a ranked table.
The table is ranked in terms of sensor trustworthiness. TRMSim-WSN then monitors the
interaction being conducted between the various components and either punishes or rewards

5

the components based on the feedback they receive. When evaluating the trustworthiness
of a sensor, UTM incorporates the following metrics: history, recommendation, context,
and platform properties. Through their experimental results, the authors concluded that the
UTM-enabled settings had higher levels of accuracy but had longer path lengths [14]. While
TRMSim-WSN provides its users with a way of testing and comparing different models
[15, 16, 17, 18], it lacks the ability to test the trust model itself and focuses on the trust
relationship between wireless sensors within a network.
DTMSim-IoT is a .NET-based simulator that calculates trust based on each observed
interaction. DTMSim-IoT consists of seven sub-modules: Network Configuration, Network
Initialization, Service Request, Service Evaluation, Trust Computation, Simulator Logs,
and Result Data Export. The Network Configuration stage allows the simulator users to
specify basic configurations such as the total number of nodes, the trust model selection, and
time delay. The Trust Computation Module follows a Reward and Punishment mechanism.
For each successful service provision, the actor’s reward is calculated by one multiplied
by the service weight (Ws), while negative two multiplied by Ws calculate failed service
transactions. The overall trust value considers both the reward and punishment values and is
a value that ranges from -1 to 1. Close to 1 represents a cooperating node, while trust values
near -1 indicate a malicious node [19].
While there are a plethora of trust simulators, most aim to simulate the relationship and trust
between participating devices or components. The trust model simulator is a field-specific
simulator that aims to showcase trust between actors within an EGoT DERMS network. In

6

addition, it provides a way to test the trust model itself while simultaneously verifying and
testing the calculations being developed.

7

3 Energy Grid of Things Distributed Energy Resource Management System

3.1

Overview

Traditional power grids are viewed as a single-stream service, i.e., an energy service user
requesting power from an energy service provider. A newer and smarter energy grid
system is proposed. This more technologically advanced and distributed energy grid is an
EGoT DERMS. EGoT DERMS offers a method for exchanging information and resources
between participating actors to provide essential reliability services, which support largescale deployment of renewable generation and electrification of loads. At the heart of the
EGoT DERMS is the Energy Service Interface (ESI). The ESI governs the information
exchange between GSP and SPC through a set of policies. Moreover, the ESI uses the
information exchanged between GSP and SPC to dispatch essential reliability services
through large-scale aggregation of Distributed Energy Resource (DER). The ESI defines a
bi-directional, service-oriented, logical interface that defines system security, privacy, and
trust. The DTM System is incorporated within the EGoT DERMS to augment the system’s
existing security measures. The DTM System serves as a detective component within
the EGoT DERMS to detect system anomalies. Figure 3.1 showcases the overall EGoT
DERMS. EGoT DERMS actors are shown in blue, while the DTM System components
are shown in red. The DTM System consists of multiple Distributed Trust Model Clients

8

(DTMCs) and a CDTA. The various components of the EGoT DERMS will be discussed in
further detail in the upcoming sub-sections [20, 21, 22].

Figure 3.1: An overview of EGoT DERMS architecture.

3.2

EGoT Infrastructure

As briefly discussed in the earlier section, an EGoT DERMS is comprised of multiple actors
working together to facilitate the transfer of information and energy services throughout the
system. In this section, the responsibilities and functionalities of each of the participating
actors within an EGoT DERMS will be further discussed. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the
overall infrastructure of an EGoT DERMS and the connections between the actors.

3.2.1

Grid Operator

The Grid Operator (GO) communicates with the GSP to acquire grid services to achieve
operational objectives. Operational objectives include maintaining operations within predefined constraints to prevent grid component and/or equipment damage.
9

3.2.2

Grid Service Provider

A GSP provides grid services to a GO through the dispatch of DER that have subscribed to
respond to a GO program or mandate. Grid services are the means by which a GO achieves
operational objectives.

3.2.3

Service Provisioning Customer

The SPC is a residential electric utility customer who owns one or moreDERs. The SPC is
interested in providing those DERs to a GSP through an aggregation program.

3.2.4

Distributed Trust Model System

Figure 3.1 shows the DTM System components in red. As mentioned earlier, the DTM
System consists of multiple DTM Systems and a single CDTA. Each of the DTMCs is
located at an SPC and provides trust evaluations to the various actors connected to that SPC.
The DTMCs aggregate the MVoT parameters for each actor, then sends the MVoTs to the
CDTA. The CDTA is located at the GSP and stores the MVoTs of all the actors within the
DTM System.

10

Figure 3.2: An overview of DTM System components with the DTMC at each SPC (right side) and CDTA at
the GSP (left side).

Figure 3.2 displays the mechanics of the DTM System in more detail. On the left side
of the dotted red line are the inter-workings of the DTM System at the SPC. The DTMC
classifies the incoming actor messages to arrive at a message evaluation category for each of
the messages. The MVoT is updated based on the message evaluation category. On the right
side of the figure is the CDTA at the GSP. The CDTA responsibilities include providing
recommendations to the GSP and providing the data needed to create dashboards for the
GO.

3.3

Information Exchange

3.3.1

System Protocols

The EGoT DERMS primarily relies on two protocols to facilitate the transfer of information
and energy resources: IEEE 2030.5 and CTA-2045. The IEEE2030.5 standard is the
11

Smart Energy Profile protocol. The IEEE 2030.5 standard defines a protocol for smart grid
communication to facilitate smart metering, demand/ response automation, and load control
[23].
CTA-2045 is a standard that defines a Modular Communications Interface (MCI) to allow
for energy management functionality in residential devices. Through the MCI, CTA-2045
provides a standard interface for communicating with user-end devices. [24]

3.3.2

Actor Infomration Exchange

To facilitate the communication between the various actors within an EGoT DERMS, the
EGoT DERMS architecture specifies three main information exchange phases. The first
phase is the GO to GSP information exchange. GO to GSP communications are defined
according to the GO’s requirements. Given the scope of this paper, we will not be discussing
GO to GSP communications in greater detail. The second phase is GSP to Distributed
Control Module (DCM) information exchange. GSP to DCM communications strictly
adheres to the IEEE 2030.5 protocol for information exchange and service requests. The
final stage is DCM to DER information exchange. DCM to DER communications can follow
several DER-specific protocols. Common DER protocols include CTA-2045 [24], SunSpec
Modbus [25], and J3072 [26].

3.4

Critical Infrastructure Attacks

Critical infrastructure attacks are cyberattacks that target systems or assets vital to a nation.
According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), there are 16 crit12

ical infrastructure sectors that include: Defence Industrial Base Sector, Emergency Service
Sector, Energy Sector, Financial Services Sector, Healthcare, and Public Health Sector, and
Water and Wastewater System Sector. An attack to any of the critical infrastructure sectors
would have a drastic impact on a nation’s security [27].

3.4.1

Attack Methodology

Attacks on a nation-state often target specific components and devices. Whether Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Human Machine Interface (HMI), or Programmable
Logic Controllere (PLC), the components within the system can be used as a launch pad for
attackers. Like the US military kill chain, cyber attacks follow a set of stages and steps. The
phases of the cyber attack chain include:
• Reconnaissance - A research phase on the target to identify possible vulnerabilities.
• Weaponization - Malware development to exploit the vulnerability found during the
reconnaissance stage.
• Delivery - Transmission of the developed malware onto the target’s machine/ system
• Exploitation - Triggering of the malware to exploit the known vulnerability
• Installation - The malware installs backdoors to allow for persistent access to the
victim’s machine/ system
• Command & Control - The attack gains persistent access via an outside server

13

• Action on Objective - The attack works toward their end goal (data theft, exfiltration,
data destruction)

3.4.2

Threat Models

Multiple risk assessment methods use threat and vulnerability modeling schemes to better
understand the impact of threats and provide an approach for mitigating them. The goal of
using a threat model differs depending on the field and environment. For smart power grids,
integrity and availability are the highest priority. One of the standard methods of ensuring
integrity and availability comes with Anomaly Detection. By constructing a model for
what “normal” and “expected” traffic look like, a normative model can assist in identifying
abnormal cases [28].
One prominent and effective attack on power grids is a Denial of Service (DOS) attack.
DOS attacks target grid availability rather than the integrity of the service requests propagating through the system. To create a threat model for a DOS attack, it is important to
understand the nature and goal of such an attack. The goal of a DOS attack is to drown
the target with a large amount of requests so that legitimate requests are prevented from
accessing the system services [29]. In the context of EGoT DERMS, a DOS attack aims at
negating the authorized requests of EGoT DERMS actors, effectively bringing the system to
a halt. Developing a threat model for EGoT DERMS DOS attacks consists of understanding the data source, the request type, and network bandwidth consumption in the form of
communication frequency.
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Another possible attack on power grids is a Man-in-The-Middle (MITM) Attack. Unlike
a DOS attack, a MITM attack aims at violating the integrity of requests within the system. A
MITM attack can take the form of legitimate communication between two EGoT DERMS
actors being intercepted and propagated by an actor; this is referred to as traffic leading.
Another form of MITM attack can be done by impersonating one or more system actors. This
is referred to as identify spoofing [30]. Regarding the EGoT DERMS, a MITM attack aims
to intercept legitimate EGoT DERMS messages and modify the messages before delivering
them to the expected receiver. Developing a threat model for the EGoT DERMS MITM
attack consists of understanding the communication standards throughout the systems and
the registration process for new actors.
Developing the various components that make up the EGoT DERMS is no small feat.
The system is complex and follows multiple protocols that intertwine and work together.
At any given moment, multiple actors could exchange hundreds of messages and service
requests. To ensure the stability and availability of the infrastructure of EGoT DERMS, the
DTM System is incorporated. The goal of the DTM System is to add to the existing system
security. The DTM System and the tools used to develop it are described in greater detail in
the upcoming chapter.
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4 Software Description

The DTM System is a component within the overarching EGoT DERMS project. The sole
purpose of the DTM System is to augment existing security measures by monitoring the
communication between the various participating EGoT DERMS actors, as shown in Figure
4.1.

Figure 4.1: A DTM System example with multiple DTMCs aggregating agent data into a CDTA.

The DTM System plays a detective rather than a preventative role within the overall
system and can provide recommendations to the service provider. DTM Systems can be
distributed across the system to monitor subgroups and aggregate their findings to the CDTA.
The DTM System uses a MVoT to represent the evaluations of each participating actor within
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EGoT DERMS [31]. The MVoT consists of 17 parameters that include Trust Score (TS),
Distrust Score (DS), Certainty (C). The complete list of MVoT variables and descriptions
can be found in Table 4.1. The rest of the participating actors include GO, GSP, DCM, and
DER.
Abbreviation
TS
DS
C
CExMsg
CUxMsg
TotMsg
Time_Stmp
Regstr_Time
ComFreq
TX_Time
Avg_TX_Time
TSLC
SDTT
RFC
T_Out
C_Alrt
C_Other

Variable
Trust Score
Distrust Score
Certainty

Description
Overall trust score for each actor
Distrust score for each actor
How certain is the DTM System for each
evaluation
Count of Expected Mes- Total count of messages that are expected
sages
for each actor
Count of Unexpected Total count of messages that are unexMessages
pected for each actor
Total Number of Mes- Count of Total messages
sages
Time of the Last Mes- Time of the most recent message received
sage Received
from the actor
Registration Date
Time of the first message received from
an actor
Registration Date
How often an actor communicates
Measured Transit Time Time difference for message to travel
from the source to destination
Average
Transaction Expected transaction time is average
Time
transaction time
Time Since Last Com- Time delta of the last message is received
munication
Standard Deviation of Extent of deviation for Transit time as a
TX Time
whole
Relative Factor of Cer- Certainty indicator of lean toward or
tainty
against TS or DS
Count of Timeouts
Total count of timeouts for each actor
Count of Alerts
Total count of alerts sent out to each actor
Count of Other Actions Total count of disconnects and additional
actions sent out to actors
Table 4.1: MVoT variables and descriptions.

Figure 4.2 shows the overall DTM software suite. The process can be started either
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Figure 4.2: An overview of the 5 stages of the DTM Simulation Suite with the components and interconnections

by reading and classifying an XML log, as shown in stage 1, or by generating a data set
using the TMDG, as shown in stage 2. Regardless of which of the two options is used to get
started, the output will be a Comma Separated Values (CSV) file with the classified output.
The classified CSV file can then be read into the TMS to run the trust model and update
the MVoT based on the trust calculation per read message, as shown in stage 3. Once the
simulator runs through the entire dataset, a CSV file with the suffix simout.csv is created
with each row in the file presenting the actor, evaluation category, and an updated MVoT.
Finally, to simulate the CDTA, multiple iterations of the simulator must be run to produce
two or more simout.csv files. All the TMS output CSV files are then fed into the merger
script, which orders the incoming messages based on their timestamp, as shown in stage 4.
This process is used to mimic the functionality of the CDTA since it will be observing all
the aggregated messages and storing them in the order in which it receives them. The output
of the merger script is a single CSV file that includes every MVoT row from each of the
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funneled in simout.csv files. Using the merger.csv file, plots and dashboards are produced
using either the perTplot script or the CDTA Dash script, as shown in stage 5. Both scripts
provide the user with a list of supported MVoT parameters and time increments. The scripts
produce a CSV file that includes the x,y data points to generate either a plot or dashboard.
Stages 1-3 simulate a DTMC at the client, while stages 4 and 5 simulate the CDTA at the
server side.
To aid in the development of the DTM System, both a TMS and TMDG were developed.
The goal of both the TMS and TMDG is to readily generate and simulate messages and
requests from the various EGoT DERMS actors. The TMDG allows the user to generate
data for the simulator run. The generator provides the user with a way to set the number of
data points and profiles that influence the nature of the generated data. Some of these profiles
can generate all expected messages, while others can allow the user to manually set the
evaluation category of a specific message. The output of the TMDG is a CSV file that is the
input to the TMS. The TMS provides the means to test and verify MVoT calculations, initial
values, and various thresholds. The TMS takes in the CSV file generated by the TMDG and
runs through the various messages while updating the MVoT of each of the participating
actors. Once completed, the values of each of the MVoTs for each actor are then written out
to a CSV file. The TMS showcases the trust relationship between the EGoT DERMS actors
over time while also providing accuracy and performance metrics to understand the trust
algorithm better.
Various components facilitate test data creation and simulation. The TMDG is in place

19

to replace real-time data, while the TMS is used to test and tweak the TM component in the
DTM System. The DTM System system consists of five main components: classifier, MVoT
calculator, CDTA, recommender, and dashboard. The role of the classifier is to characterize
incoming messages and produce an evaluation for each message. The MVoT calculator
updates each MVoT parameter based on the evaluation category of the incoming message.
The CDTA receives MVoT values from the DTMCs and calculates periodic normalized
values. The recommender sends alerts and recommendations to GSP based on the set
thresholds. Finally, the dashboard presents the aggregated MVoT data to the GSP.
The Trust Model testing suite starts with the TMDG, where a user can generate CSV
files to reflect a specific messaging pattern. The generated CSV file includes the actor name,
the message evaluation category, current time, and transit time. The TMS then reads in the
CSV file as an input and then runs through the rows of the CSV file. Based on the message
evaluation of each actor, the MVoT entry for each actor is updated appropriately. Once the
simulator completes reading the entire data set, a new CSV file is generated. The new CSV
file includes the same information as the CSV file produced by the TMDG plus the updated
MVoT of each of the actors. A merger script mimics the functionality of the CDTA. The
goal of the merger script is to aggregate multiple TMS outputs into a single CSV file. The
output of the merger script is a CSV file that includes all the actors and their MVoT ranked
based on their time of arrival at the CDTA. The merger CSV file then generates plots per
some user-defined time increment or generate the CDTA plots used in the dashboard.
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5 Experimental Setup

The DTM System is composed of many different blocks and stages. Figure 5.1 showcases
the relationship between the TMDG and the TMS. Moreover, Figure 5.1 presents the
different blocks and stages within the DTM System. First, a CSV file is read within the
Trust Model Simulator; the CSV file is produced by either the generator or the classifier.
Next, its content is passed on to the Trust Calculation block. If the incoming message is
the first from the actor, a new trust vector is created for the actor. If the incoming message
is not the first message, the existing trust vector for the actor is updated to include a new
entry. Once the trust calculations are completed, the updated MVoT parameters are then
stored in the MVoT block. The trust calculation output is also passed to the Threshold block.
Within the Threshold block, the incoming trust results are compared against various limits.
The Decision block then processes the output of the threshold comparison to arrive at the
appropriate action based on the provided threshold information. Finally, a recommendation
is passed to the Action block, where the relevant authorities receive a recommendation or
alert based on the information gathered throughout the TMS process. The type of the alert is
also stored in the MVoT for each actor to influence future recommendations.
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Figure 5.1: An overview of TMDG and TMS interconnection and component blocks.

The MVoT-based TMS can be run using two different input streams. The first input is by
reading and parsing GSP, DCM, and DER logs. Once the logs of each of the participating
actors are parsed, an evaluation category is associated with each of the messages, and then
the trust calculations can begin. A list of evaluation categories and their descriptions is
presented in Table 5.1.
Evaluation
Description
Expected (Ex)
All message contents are presented, valid, and follow the correct order.
Unexpected (Ux)
The message is repetitive, out-of-order, or contains extreme values.
Indeterminant (Ind) The DTM System is unable to classify the message.
Discconect (Dis)
The device is nonresponsive.
Error (Err)
The message content is incorrect or missing.
None (N)
The message does not fit any classification.
Table 5.1: Evaluation categories and descriptions.

The second method to run the TMS uses the TMDG to create a CSV file that includes
a list of actors, message evaluation categories, time stamps, and transit time. The TMS
can read in this CSV file, and the simulator will go through the messages and run through
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the process until it arrives at a recommendation. While the two processes appear similar,
they mimic and test different parts of the DTM System. The first implementation tests the
classification portion of the system. This part of the system is considered more realistic since
the DTM is conducting the classification on legitimate logs. Here, the DTM reads actual
XML logs and parses them to extract the necessary information to provide an evaluation. The
second implementation rapidly tests the MVoT, thresholds, and recommendation messages.
The generator gives users the ability to mass-produce data sets aimed at testing various
aspects of the DTM System while still being time-efficient. The input format of the TMS can
differ depending on the path used to run the simulator; however, the information required
to run the simulator is consistent regardless of the input stream. Whether an XML log or a
generated CSV file, the necessary information to get the simulation started is the same. The
simulator input must contain the actor, the target or evaluation category, and a time stamp.
Other information such as transit time and HTML hrefs can provide a better assessment but
are not necessary.
As a part of the simulator process, and depending on the message evaluation catergory
associated with each incoming message, the MVoT parameters are updated. A description
of all 17 MVoT variables are briefly described below.
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5.1

Trust Score (TS)

The Trust Score calculation, presented in Equation 5.1, shows how the overall trust of an
actor is derived. The TS calculation takes into account multiple factors and parameters.
Some obvious factors are the number of Expected Messages (ExMsg) and a weighted (α)
number of Unexpected Messages (UnMsg). α is used to determine the impact negative
messages have on the overall TS score. Certainty (C) is incorporated into the TS calculation
to represent the DTM confidence value regarding the actor in question. The confidence
calculation is made up of multiple parameters and will be discussed in further detail in
Equation 5.3.
T S(i) = [CExM SG(i) − (α × CU nM SG(i))] × C(i)

5.2

(5.1)

Distrust Score (DS)

Many existing trust models arrive at a single trust score. This creates a potential problem
because an indication of an anomaly due to one factor can be hidden or overwhelmed by
the effects of other variables. The attacker can take advantage of this concept by loading
some false messages to influence the overall score. To help avoid this, we keep a separate
distrust score (DS) to flag or track suspicious activity. Unlike Equation 5.1, Distrust Score
quantifies how untrustworthy an actor is. DS considers the number of Unexpected Messages
(UnMsg) and Certainty (C).
DS(i) = CU nM SG(i) × C(i)

(5.2)
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5.3

Certainty (C)

Certainty plays a critical role in evaluating the overall trust. The DTM System represents
the confidence of each actor within the DTM System using a Certainty score. Certainty
is a function of an actor’s Relative Factor of Certainty, 1 − e(−γ×T otM sg) , normalized
Communication Frequency (ComFreq), and normalized Time Since Last Communication
(TSLC). Gamma (γ) in 1 − e(−γ×T otM sg) is a weighting value used to dictate the influence
the Total Message Count (TotMsg) has on Certainty (C).
C(i) = (RF C × (1 − e(−γ×T otM sg) ×

5.4

min_T SLC
ComF req
)) ×
max_ComF req
T SLC

(5.3)

Count of Expected Messages (CExMsg

Count of Expected Messages is used by multiple MVoT parameters to gauge an actor’s
expected communication history. The DTM System increments CExMsg based on its
evaluation of the incoming messages being expected.
CExM sg(i) = CExM sg(i − 1) + 1

5.5

(5.4)

Count of Unexpected Messages (CUxMsg)

Count of Unexpected Messages is used by multiple MVoT parameters to gauge an actor’s
unexpected communication history. The DTM System increments CUxMsg based on
its evaluation of the incoming messages being unexpected. A relatively high number of
Unexpected Messages could signal to the DTM System that an actor is acting maliciously
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resulting in the actor being flagged for suspicious activity.
CU xM sg(i) = CU xM sg(i − 1) + 1

5.6

(5.5)

Count of Total Messages (TotMsg)

Count of Total Messages is used by the DTM to keep a count of all incoming messages
regardless of their evaluation category.
T otM sg(i) = T otM sg(i − 1) + 1

5.7

(5.6)

Time Stamp (Time_Stmp)

As messages traverse through EGoT, the DTM updates the Time_Stmp parameter for each
actor’s message to keep track of the time in which the message was received.
T ime_Stmp(i) = Current time in U nix time

5.8

(5.7)

Registration Time (Regstr_Time)

Registration Time is the Time_Stmp for when an actor sends their first message. The use for
Regstr_Time is to quantify how long an actor has been participating in grid services
T ime_Stmp(i) = T ime_Stmp(0)

5.9

(5.8)

Communication Frequency (ComFreq)

The Communication Frequency calculation, in Equation 5.9, provides the frequency at
which an actor is requesting grid services. ComFreq is used to identify drastic shifts in an
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actor’s communication rate.
ComF req =

5.10

T otM sg
Current T ime − Regstr_T ime

(5.9)

Transit Time (TX_Time) and Average Transit Time (Avg_TX_Time)

Transit Time is used by the DTM System to understand the time it take for a message to
propagate from the sending actor to the receiving actor. Equation 5.10 looks at the Average
Transit Time, which represents the mean value of message transaction time. Based on
the calculated values, the DTM can evaluate whether or not the message’s transit time is
expected or not.
n

1X
µn =
(xi )
n i=1
5.11

(5.10)

Time Since Last Communication (TSLC)

Equation 5.10 describes the time between an actor’s messages. TSLC is used to understand
how active/unactive a user is and identify any anomalies associated with their communication
patterns.
T SLC = ∆time of last message received

5.12

(5.11)

Standard Deviation of Transit Time (SDTT)

Equation 5.12 is for the Standard Deviation of Transit Time (SDTT). SDTT is updated with
every new incoming message from an actor.
v
u n
u1 X
σ=t
(xi − µn )2
n i=1

(5.12)
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5.13

Relative Factor of Cerainty RFC

Equation 5.13 refers to the Relative Factor for Certainty (RFC). RFC measures the balance
between expected and unexpected messages. The relative certainty of an evaluation (for
example, whether to send a message or not) is influenced by how heavily the data leans
towards either expected or unexpected. The β sets the maximum value of what RFC can be.
For example, if β = 2, then the maximum RFC value is 1.0.
RF C = |

5.14

CExM sg
− 0.5| × β
CExM sg + CU nM sg

(5.13)

Count Of Timeouts (C_Out)

Equation 5.14 refers to the count of timeouts associated with an actor. Timeouts can be
caused by an ignored heartbeat signal or an actor unexpectedly disconnecting from the
system.
T _Out(i) = T _Out(i − 1) + 1

5.15

(5.14)

Count Of Alerts (C_Alert)

Equation 5.15 refers to the count of alerts associated with an actor. Alerts are generated for
a wide range of reasons. A list of alerts can be found in the CDTA discussion in Chapter 4.
C_Alrt(i) = C_Alrt(i − 1) + 1

(5.15)
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5.16

Count Of Other Actions (C_Other)

Equation 5.16 refers to the count of other alerts associated with an actor. Count Of Other
Actions is reserved for additional actions that may be introduced in the future.

C_Other(i) = C_Other(i − 1) + 1

(5.16)

Parameter Description
α
The weighting factor of trust and distrust
γ
Sets the maximum value of what RFC can be
β
The weighting factor dictating the influence messaging count has on certainty
Table 5.2: MVoT parameters and descriptions.

Table 5.2 presents the parameters used in some of the MVoT equations. One of the
purposes of the TMS is to evaluate the values associated with the parameters. Moreover, the
TMS was used to fine-tune parameter effects on MVoT variables.

Once the simulation is completed, the CDTA assesses and evaluates the MVoT values
for each DTMC. The MVoTs for each of the actors are then compared against thresholds
and other actors’ MVoTs to arrive at a recommendation. The DTM System uses the
recommendations to alert the appropriate personnel of abnormal activities detected by the
CDTA.
Alerts and recommendations include:
• "Excessive time since last communication from DER"
• "Trust is low for GSP/DCM/DER"
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• "Communication rate is low from GSP/DCM/DER"
Due to the limited data available and the need for readily available data sets, the Trust Model
Data Generator was developed. The TMDG supports multiple profiles and a user-specified
number of data points and time increments.
Developed profiles include:
• All expected (Ex): This profile generates only expected data
• All unexpected (Ux): This profile generates only unexpected data
• Almost good (Ex and Ux): This profile generates expected messages until a userspecified threshold is reached, in which case it switches to unexpected messages.
• Almost bad (Ex and Ux): This profile generates unexpected messages until a userspecified threshold is reached, in which case it switches to expected messages.
• Random (Ex, Ux, Ind, Err, Dis, and None) : This profile assigns a random message
evaluation category to a random actor.
• Mixed (Ex, Ux, Ind, Err, Dis, and None): This profile allows the user to specify two
or more of the supported profiles.
• User specified (Ex, Ux, Ind, Err, Dis, and None): This profile allows the user to
manually set the message evaluation category for an actor.
The output of the TMDG is a CSV file that includes actor name, message evaluation category,
transit time, and the current time. The TMDG CSV file is then used as the input for the Trust
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Model Simulator and to populate the MVoTs associated with each of the participating actors.
There are various calculations for calculating MVoT values rather than a single value. The
MVoT and output CSV files from the TMDG and their role throughout the DTM System are
discussed in the upcoming chapter.
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6 Experimental Results

Throughout this thesis, the TMDG, TMS, CDTA plotting tools, and DTM Classifier were
used to help design and fine-tune the DTM System. As mentioned in the previous chapters,
the limited "real" data available required a tool that would readily create testing data leading
to the development of the TMDG and DTM Classifier. Moreover, the unique design
and functionality of the DTM System by using an MVoT required the TMS to verify the
calculations, initial values, and thresholds. The DTM System and CDTA demonstrate the
aggregation of data and the sending of recommendation messages/ alerts. Moreover, the
CDTA plotting tools provide the required data points to create the CDTA dashboard.

6.1

Trust Model Data Generator

The Trust Model Data generator is a Python program that takes in user input as parameters
and generates a data set based on the user input. The output of the generator is a CSV file
with the contents shown in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: An example of a TMDG output showing a random dataset with actors communicating every 10
seconds.

Table 6.1 shows the output of the TMDG. The first column lists participating actors;
this list includes the DER, DCM, DERAS, and DTM. The second column is the message
evaluation category associated with each message. The possible categories are Expected
(Ex), Unexpected (Ux), Indeterminate (Ind), Disconnected (Dis), Error (Err), and None (N).
The third column is when the message was sent in Unix Epoch time (Seconds since January
1st, 1970 UTC). The fourth column is the transit time for the message. Given that this is
an artificially generated dataset, the transit time is a random time between 150 ms and 450
ms. Finally, the last column is the attack status. The generator can generate a data set with
messages pre-labeled as attacks for testing purposes.

6.2

Trust Model Simulator

The Trust Model Simulator reads in a CSV file containing EGoT DERMS actors and their
message evaluation categories. The TMS is built on the same Trust Model engine in the
DTM System. As a result, the TMS uses the same initial values, thresholds, and MVoT
33

calculations. As each message is received, the TMS updates all the MVoT parameters. Once
the simulation is completed, a CSV file is created showing the input to the simulator and the
MVoT values for all the parameters per message. An example of the simulator output CSV
file can be seen in Table 6.1.

Figure 6.1: An example of a TMS output showing the MVoT variables for each actor.

Referring to Figure 6.1, the first four columns of the output CSV file are the input to the
simulator. As mentioned earlier, the input is a CSV file generated by the TMDG or based
on a classified XML log. The column represents the actor name (column 1/A) , message
evaluation category (column 2/B), the current time (column 3/C), and transit time (column
4/D). The remainder of the columns are values calculated by the simulator based on the
input. The remainder of the columns are:
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Column Description
5/E
Trust score value
6/F
Reputation value
7/G
Distrust score value
8/H
How certain is the DTM for each evaluation
9/I
Certainty indicator of lean toward or against trust score or distrust score
10/J
Total count of messages that are expected for each actor
11/K
Total count of messages that are unexpected for each actor
12/L
Number of total messages
13/M
Message time stamp
14/N
This can be the first time a message is received from an actor
15/O
How often an actor communicates
16/P
Message transit time
17/Q
Average transit time
18/R
Time since last communication
19/S
Total count of timeouts for each actor
20/T
Total count of alerts sent out to each actors
21/U
Other action count
22/V
SD transit time
23/W
Max CommFreq
24/X
Min TSLC
25/Y
DTM response
Table 6.2: An overview of the columns in a TMS output csv file.

The simulator output CSV file allows researchers to see how an actor’s MVoT parameters
change as more communication occurs. The CDTA dashboard also uses it to create plots
and diagrams for the GO to view DTM System status.

6.3

DTM Classifier

Revisiting figure 4.2 in the software Description section, we can better understand the DTM
workflow and the various components that create the DTM System. Referring to Figure 6.2,
the operation starts at step 1. In this section, an XML log is provided to the DTM. The DTM
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is tasked with classifying the message to arrive at a message evaluation category. Incoming
messages are broken down into their individual XML tags and are parsed and compared
against a schema to ensure that they are the correct format, type, and within the expected
range for that target. Based on the various checks, a message evaluation is produced and is
written to a CSV file along with the ‘from’ and ‘to’ actors, current time, and a pseudo-real
transit time. Alternatively, the same outcome can be achieved by running the Trust Model
Generator at step 2. However, unlike the workflow at step 1, step 2 mimicks the classifier
outcome. No messages are being classified, but a message evaluation category is associated
with the messages based on their user-specified arguments when running the generator.
A classified output is located at step 3. As mentioned and seen in Figure 6.2, a user can
arrive at this file by either running the Trust Model Generator or classifying an incoming
XML log. This CSV file contains the actor name, a message evaluation category, time stamp,
and transit time.
1
XML Log

Parser

Evaluator

Trust Model Classifier (TMC)

2

3
Profile

n Data
Points

Timestep

Trust Model Data Generator (TMDG)

CSV file
Classifed output

Figure 6.2: Trust Model System stages 1-3

Referring to Figure 6.3, we find that the Trust Model Simulator is located at step 4. As
mentioned in great detail earlier in this chapter, the TMS reads in the CSV file and writes
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out a CSV file with the tag "_Simout.csv", as shown in step 5.
3
CSV file
Classifed output

4
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MVoT

CSV file
(*_Simout.csv)

Trust
Calculator

TMS output
Trust Model Simulator (TMS)

Figure 6.3: Trust Model System stages 3-5

As shown in Figure 6.4, to run the merger script in step 6, a dataset of 2 or more TMS
output CSV files (*_Simout.csv) is required. The script reads the user-specified CSV files
and creates a single CSV file with all the entries from the TMS output sorted in order of
which they would have been received at the CDTA.
5

CSV file
(*_Simout.csv)
TMS output

7
Multiple simulator
ouput CSV files

Merger Script
6

CSV file
(merger.csv)
Merger output

Figure 6.4: Trust Model System stages 5-7

6.4

Plots and Dashboards

As the messages get aggregated by the merger script, we arrive at a single CSV file that
contains all the messages and MVoT for all the participating actors. The data in the CSV
file is parsed to provide valuable information about the overall system state. Referring to
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Figure 6.5, once the merger script is completed, it generates a single CSV file, as shown in
step 7. This CSV file can then be used to generate plots and CDTA dashboards, as shown in
steps 8 and 9, respectively.
7

CSV file
(merger.csv)
Merger output

8

9

Per t plot

CDTA
Dashboard

Figure 6.5: Trust Model System stages 7-9

By supporting plots and dashboards in the DTM System, an operator can monitor the
overall system status. The DTM System Dashboard also provides critical information at
a glance. The DTM Dashboard and plotting program support a wide range of MVoTs and
time increments. The plotting program facilitates extracting the data associated with any of
the MVoT and retrieves information on a per-minute basis. The dashboard is a dynamic and
powerful tool that is valuable to the researchers working on the project and Grid Operators
looking to understand how the system behaves. The remainder of this chapter showcases
and discusses some of the plots and dashboards supported by the DTM System.
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Figure 6.6: Normalized Trust Score Vs. Time for an Ideal Dataset

Figure 6.6 show the evolution of the Normalized Trust Score over time for an ideal
dataset (i.e. all messages are evaluated to be expected). For this plot, there are 10 SPCs,
each has a DER, DCM, and GSP, giving us a total of 30 actors resulting in 30 different
MVoTs that the CDTA is aggregating. This plot describes the first 40 hours since 30 actors
register with the DTM system.
As shown, the Normalized trust score decreases slightly during the first few hours. This
is expected as we initialize the certainty value to 10 percent, and the DTM needs time before
the various parameters adjust. As time goes on, the Normalized trust score starts to increase.
The longer and more frequent an actor communicates expectedly, the higher their trust score
becomes.
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Figure 6.7: Normalized Trust Score vs. Cumulative Distribution Function: Hour 1

Figure 6.7 shows the Normalized Trust Score vs. Cumulative Distribution Function plot
for the first hour. Since this is only the first hour, there is not much variation even though
some actors communicate more frequently than others. This is because the actors have not
communicated enough messages yet. As we discuss the normalized CDF of later hours,
there will be more variance.

Figure 6.8: Normalized Trust Score vs. Cumulative Distribution Function: Hour 15
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A plot of the normalized trust score vs CDF for the 15th hour is shown in Figure 6.8.
There is more variation in the data. Specifically,there are four sharp increases in probability.
This is attributed to the fact that our dataset is made up of actors communicating at four
different communication frequencies. Some actors communicate every 5 minutes, some
every 10 minutes, some every 15 minutes, and the majority of actors communicating every
hour.
Referring to the Figure 6.8, most actors lag behind in terms of their normalized trust
score. This is because the majority of the actors are communicating every hour, so they
would have fewer expected messages, resulting in a lower normalized trust score.
The actors communicating every 15 minutes, which make up 20 percent of the data set,
have a normalized trust score that ranges from 0.15 to 0.36. The actors communicating every
10 minutes, which make up another 20 percent of the data set, are spread out from around
the 0.36 mark to around 0.60. A greater spread in Normalized Trust Score for these actors
because certainty, incorporated in the trust score calculation, is non-linear. Finally, the most
frequently communicating actors have a normalized trust score ranging from 0.60 to 1.
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Figure 6.9: Normalized Trust Score vs. Cumulative Distribution Function: Hour 25

Referring to Figure 6.9, the majority of actors are still lagging in terms of their normalized trust score. This is once again because most of the actors communicate every
hour.
Most of the actors communicating every 15 minutes have their normalized trust score
range between 0.27 to 0.36 instead of the 0.15 to 0.36 range from the earlier plot in figure
6.8. The actors communicating every 10 minutes had their normalized trust score range
spread out from the 0.34 mark to around 0.65, instead of the 0.36 to 0.60 range from the
earlier plot in Figure 6.8. Finally, the most frequently communicating actors had their
normalized trust score range from 0.65 to 1, instead of 0.60 to 1 from the previous plot in
figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.10: Normalized Trust Score vs. Cumulative Distribution Function: Hour 40

Referring to Figure 6.10, while the actors communicating every hour still have a
normalized trust score less than 0.1, all the actors are increasing in trust score and slowly
approaching 0.1
The actors communicating every 15 minutes have increased to where most of the actors
have a normalized trust score that ranges from 0.35 to 0.43, instead of the 0.27 to 0.36 in the
previous plot in figure 6.9. Likewise, the actors communicating every 5 minutes now range
from 0.7 to 1 instead of the 0.65 to 1 range.
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Figure 6.11: TSLC vs.Trust Score for 40 hours with varying communication frequencies

Figure 6.11 shows the relationship between TSLC and TS. The plot showcases the TS
collected from 100 SPC actors. The DTMCs of each SPC aggregated the MVoT values to
the CDTA. All 100 SPC actors communicated through a 40-hour time frame with varying
communication frequencies. The range of communication frequencies is as follows:
- 10 SPC actors communicated every 10 minutes (600 seconds)
- 10 SPC actors communicating every 15 minutes (900 seconds)
- 10 SPC actors communicating every 20 minutes (1200 seconds)
- 15 SPC actors communicating every 30 minutes (1800 seconds)
- 15 SPC actors communicating every 35 minutes (2100 seconds)
- 15 SPC actors communicating every 40 minutes (2400 seconds)
- 10 SPC actors communicating every 45 minutes (2700 seconds)
- 5 SPC actors communicating every 50 minutes (3000 seconds)
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- 5 SPC actors communicating every 55 minutes (3300 seconds)
- 5 SPC actors communicating every 60 minutes (3600 seconds)

Looking at the plots in Figures 6.7 to 6.11, as more expected messages are communicated, the actor’s overall normalized trust score increases, and the variation in the plotted
data becomes more apparent.
The DTM Simulation Suite provides powerful tools to modify, enhance, and test the
DTM. The TMDG allows for datasets with varying characteristics to be readily generated.
The TMS provides the MVoT calculations, parameters, initial values, and thresholds to be
fine-tuned to give the DTM the optimum classification and detection level. Finally, the
CDTA plotting tools provides a GO with an interface for EGOT DERMS.
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7 Conclusion

The work described in this thesis aims to showcase the DTM System and the DTM Simulation Suite and their positive effect on EGoT DERMS. Furthermore, the DTM System
enhanced and modified by the DTM Simulation Suite augments the existing security of
DERMS as defined by the IEEE 2030.5 protocol.
The DTM Simulation Suite consists of the Trust Model Data Generator, Trust Mode
Simulator, and CDTA plotting tools. The DTM Simulation Suite was developed to provide
EGOT DERMS with a method for classifying messages between participating system actors,
detecting system anomalies, and notifying the appropriate parties in the event of suspicious
activity. The DTM Simulation Suite also honed in on the DTM’s Trust Model to evaluate it
and further improve it.
The Trust Model Data Generator was developed to generate datasets that depict real
actor communications readily. The Trust Model Simulator incorporated the DTM Systems
Trust Model to fine-tune it for correctness and accuracy. The Trust Model Simulator ran
on hundreds of datasets generated by the Trust Model Generator to identify errors and
shortcomings in MVoT equations. In addition, the CDTA plotting tools facilitated the
creation of dashboard plots from aggregated data acquired throughout the DTM System,
allowing Grid Operators to view the status of EGoT DERMS at a glance.
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The DTM classifier can be further improved with machine learning to improve anomaly
detection and data generation. Using a Trust Model Data Generator, an ML model can be
trained to allow for more variation in the datasets than currently offered by the TMDG.
Furthermore, providing real-time weather reports to the ML model can enable the DTM
Classifier to consider weather-induced changes in communication patterns. The suggested
improvement would improve detection rates and minimize false positives and negatives.
Security is an arms race, and attackers are a constant threat. The approach and solution
discussed in this thesis allow for additional security in smart grids. The DTM System and its
Simulation Suite complements grid security and adds extra layers of security and detection,
making the energy sector of a nation’s critical infrastructure more reliable, sustainable, and
secure.
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Appendix A: Running the Software

To run the DTM System Simulation Suite, the system must be supported and all the
dependencies must be installed.

A.1

Dependencies

A.1.1

System Dependencies

Both the trust model simulator and data generator have been tested on Linux and macOS.
This how-to guide mimics the process on a Linux machine running Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS.
This is a Python-based program tested on Python 3.8.5. Other versions of Python3 should
work but haven’t been tested.

A.1.2

Library Dependencies

To run the Simulation Suite, the Pandas library must be installed. To install Pandas, start by
installing pip3
sudo apt install python3-pip
Once pip3 is installed, install Pandas
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pip3 install pandas

A.2

Running the Software

A.2.1

Running the Trust Mode Data Generator

python3 TMsimDataGenerator.py -f [FILENAME] -p [PROFILE]
-n [NUMBER OF DATA POITNS] -i [TIMESTEP] -pa {optional}
[PROFILE ADDONS] -ma {optional} [MIXED ARGS]
-db {optional} [DER BIAS]

FILENAME - The name of the file you are generating. This must be a csv file (.csv)
PROFILE - The profile you want the generated data to be. Pick one of the profiles available
below.
- ideal - This profile only generates expected data
- random - This randomly assigns a message evaluation to a random actor
- flawed - This profile generates no expected messages
- almost_good - This profile generates expected messages until the last set
- almost_bad - This profile generates Ux, Ind, Dis, N messages until the last set
N DATA POINTS - The number of messages to be generated per actor
TIMESTEP - The increment between each message
PROFILE ADDONS - Allows for special funcitonality in some profiles
- Random profile - if PROFILE ADDONS is 1, each data point will have a random timestamp
- almost_good - if PROFILE ADDONS is not zero, PROFILE ADDONS value will be where
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a UX message is added
- almost_bad - if PROFILE ADDONS is not zero, PROFILE ADDONS value will be where
a EX message is added
MIXED ARGS - Allows the user to specify the profiles to be used in the mixed profile
DER BIAS - Alows the user to specify how many more DERs should be generated

A.2.2

Trust Mode Data Generator Example

python3 TMsimDataGenerator.py -f test.csv -p ideal -n 100 -i 1

This example generates a file called test.csv, the message evaluation for all the actors will be
expected. There will be 100 messages per actor (400 messages total) and there is 1-sec step
in the time

A.2.3

Running the Trust Mode Simulator

python3 TMsim.py -f [FILENAME] -e [EQUATION] -d [DEBUG]

FILENAME - The name of the file you generated. This must be a csv file (.csv)
EQUATION - The equation version to be used. This is to allow for multiple equation
versions. For now, there is only one version of equations so use "v1" when running.
DEBUG - This parameter allows for the simulator to run one message at a time. It will
require the user to press a button to move to the next message. Options:
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y - run simulator in debug mode
n - run simulator automatically

A.2.4

Trust Mode Simulator Example

python3 TMsim.py -f test.csv -e v1 -d n

This example would provide test.csv as an input to the simulator. The simulator will run
using the first version of the MVoT equations and will be running in automatic mode.

A.2.5

Running CDTA Merger Script

python3 merger.py -f [FILE 1] [FILE 2] ... [FILE N]

All thats needed to run the CDTA merger script is to list all the csv files that you would
like to merger in the current directory. The script will run on all the csv files entered in the
command line same directory that it is in. If there are csv files with a different format, it
might cause issues.

A.2.6

Running CDTA Per Time Script

python3 perTPlots.py -f [FILE] -t [TIME] -i [INCREMENT]

FILENAME - The name of the file to read from (csv)
TIME - The sample size of the data in seconds. i.e. using 60 will give the last value per
minute
INCREMENT - The number of hours you want within the data set
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Appendix B: DTM Classifer visual

The DTM System Classifier reads an XML log containing incoming messages and breaks
the log into individual XML tags. Those XML tags are compared against a schema to ensure
that they are in the correct format, type, and within the expected range for that target.Figure
B.1 shows a visualization of the Trust Model Classifier input XML log (left side) and the
classifier output CSV file (right side).

Figure B.1: XML to CSV conversion executed by the Trust Model Classifer
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Appendix C: DTM Simulator Code

# Abdullah Barghouti
# DTM Tool - Trust Model Simulator
# Portland State University Fall 2020

import sys
import csv
import argparse
import pathlib
import time
import math

import pandas as pd
from datetime import date

#take in user arguments
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument('-f', '--file', required=True, metavar='',
help = 'name of the file that will be generated')
ap.add_argument('-e', '--equation', required=True, metavar='',
help = 'the equation to be used to calculate trust')
ap.add_argument('-d', '--debug', required=False, metavar='',
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help = 'runs simulator in debug mode. Prints with user input')
args = ap.parse_args()

fileName = args.file
sfn = fileName.split(".csv")
simOutFileName = sfn[0] + "_SimOut.csv"

#Weights
ALPHA = 10
BETA = 2
DELTA = 1
GAMMA = 0.05

#Inital variables
n_SDTT = 0
n_AvgTX = 0
MAX_COMMFREQ = 0.0
ACTOR_MAX_COMMFREQ = {'DCM': 0.0, 'DTM': 0.0,
'DERAS': 0.0, 'DER': 0.0}
MIN_TSLC = 100
ACTOR_MIN_TSLC = {'DCM': 100000.0, 'DTM': 100000.0,
'DERAS': 100000.0, 'DER': 100000.0}

#load in threshold information into dictionaries
threshDict_over = {
"distrust score" : 50,
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"timeout count": 2,
"alert count" : 2,
"time since last communication": 700
}

threshDict_under = {
"trust score" : .1,
"certainty" : .1,
"relative factor of certainty": .5,
"communication frequency": 1,
}

# response block thresholds
R_THRESH_TS = 4
R_THRESH_DS = 1.6
R_THRESH_C = 0.8
R_THRESH_TotMsg = 10
R_THRESH_CommFrq = 3.3
R_THRESH_CommFrq_HIGH = 6
R_THRESH_TxT = 40
R_THRESH_TSLC = 900
R_THRESH_RFC = 0.5

# response list
DTM_response = []
#increase to increase message freq
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CFC = 0

#time stamp increment
TIMESTAMP = 1

TEMP = 0

#MVoT Parameters
param = {"trust score" : 0,
"reputation" : 0,
"distrust score" : 0,
"certainty" : 0.1,
"relative factor of certainty": 0,
"expected message count" : 0,
"unexpected message count" : 0,
"total message count" : 0,
"time stamp" : 0,
"registration date" : 0,
"communication frequency" : 0,
"message transit time" : 0,
"average transit time" : 0,
"time since last communication" : 0,
"timeout count" : 0,
"alert count" : 0,
"other action count" : 0,
"SD transit time" : 0,
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"Max CommFreq" : 0.0,
"Min TSLC" : 100000.0,
#"DTM response:" : 0
}

TIME = time.time()

#Current MVoT Dict
currentTrustVector = {'DCM': param,
'DTM': param.copy(), 'DERAS': param.copy(),
'DER': param.copy()}

#Prev MVoT Dict
oldTrustVector = {'DCM': param.copy(),
'DTM': param.copy(), 'DERAS': param.copy(),
'DER': param.copy()}
#

0

1

2

3

actorList = {'DCM', 'DTM', 'DERAS' , 'DER'}

initalTime = {0,0,0,0}

#read from data (csv) file
'''
this function is in charge of updating
message counts and takes in a full row from the csv file
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generated by the trust model data generator
'''
def messageCount(current_row):
actor = current_row[0]

#update old vector
oldTrustVector[actor]['unexpected message count'] =
currentTrustVector[actor]['unexpected message count']

oldTrustVector[actor]['expected message count'] =
currentTrustVector[actor]['expected message count']

oldTrustVector[actor]['total message count'] =
currentTrustVector[actor]['total message count']

print(" oldTrustVector[actor]['unexpected message count']",
oldTrustVector[actor]['unexpected message count'])
if (row[1] == 'Ex'):
#update ex count
currentTrustVector[actor]['expected message count'] += 1
else:
#update unex count
currentTrustVector[actor]["unexpected message count"] += 1
print("currentTrustVector[actor]['unexpected message count']"
,currentTrustVector[actor]['unexpected message count'])
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#update total message
currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"] =
(currentTrustVector[actor]['expected message count'] +
currentTrustVector[actor]["unexpected message count"])

'''
this function is in charge of updating time
related MVoT variables and takes in a full row
from the csv file generated by the trust model
data generator
'''
def timeKeeping(current_row):
#get actor name
actor = current_row[0]
print(actor)

#time stamp
#set time stamp from 3rd col of generated data file
print("old time stamp

= ", oldTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"])

currentTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"] = float(current_row[2])

#normal operations, update time stamp and TSLC
if (currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"] > 1):
currentTrustVector[actor]["time since last communication"] =
(currentTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"]
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- oldTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"])
#normalize TSLC
global MIN_TSLC
if (currentTrustVector[actor]
["time since last communication"] <
ACTOR_MIN_TSLC[actor]):
ACTOR_MIN_TSLC[actor] = currentTrustVector[actor]
["time since last communication"]
currentTrustVector[actor]["Min TSLC"] =
ACTOR_MIN_TSLC[actor]

#calculate normalized comm freq
if (currentTrustVector[actor]["communication frequency"] >
ACTOR_MAX_COMMFREQ[actor]):
ACTOR_MAX_COMMFREQ[actor] = currentTrustVector[actor]
["communication frequency"]
currentTrustVector[actor]["Max CommFreq"] =
ACTOR_MAX_COMMFREQ[actor]

#first incounter. Set registration to be
#current time (time stamp) and TSLC to zero
if (currentTrustVector[actor]["registration date"] == 0):
currentTrustVector[actor]["registration date"] =
currentTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"]
currentTrustVector[actor]
["time since last communication"] = 0
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oldTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"] = 0

#update timestamp
oldTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"] =
float(currentTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"])

#message transit time
currentTrustVector[actor]["message transit time"] =
float(current_row[3])

print("Done timekeeping")
print()

'''
this function is in charge of ... and takes in a
full row from the csv file
generated by the trust model data generator
'''

def response(current_row):
actor = current_row[0]
response_flag = 0
print("----RESPONSE SECTION----")
#to see where we are
print(currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"])
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#check for Excessive TSLC
if (currentTrustVector[actor]
["time since last communication"] >
threshDict_over["time since last communication"]):
message = "Excessive time since
last communication from " + actor
DTM_response.append(message)
response_flag = 1
print(DTM_response)

#check for low trust score
if (currentTrustVector[actor]["trust score"] <
threshDict_under["trust score"] and
currentTrustVector[actor]["certainty"] >
threshDict_under["trust score"] and
currentTrustVector[actor]
["relative factor of certainty"] >
threshDict_under["relative factor of certainty"] and
currentTrustVector[actor]["distrust score"] >
threshDict_over["distrust score"]):
message = "Trust is low for " + actor
DTM_response.append(message)
response_flag = 1
print(DTM_response)
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if (not response_flag):
message = "Do nothing"
DTM_response.append(message)

currentTrustVector[actor]["DTM response"] =
' '.join(DTM_response)
print("DTM response", currentTrustVector[actor]
["DTM response"])
DTM_response.clear()

'''
this function prints the contents of the the MVoT to a
userspecified CSV file
'''
def printToCSV(row,x):

d = {'Actor' : row[0],
'Message Eval Catagory' : row[1],
'Current Time' : row[2],
'Transit Time' : row[3]
}
actor = row[0]
df2 = pd.DataFrame(row)
print("df2", df2)
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#df1 = pd.DataFrame(d,index=range(len(d)))
df1 = pd.DataFrame(d,index=range(len(d)-3))
#df2 = df1.join(df2)
print("df2 join", df2)
df = pd.DataFrame(currentTrustVector[actor],
index=range(int(len(currentTrustVector[actor].keys())/
len(currentTrustVector[actor].values()))))
print("df")
print(df)
df1 = df1.join(df)
#df2 = df2.join(df)
print("df1")
print(df1.columns)

if (x == 0):
today = date.today()
td = today.strftime("%d/%m/%Y")
info = {'Name':args.file,
'Data':td}
#csv.writer('test1.csv', 'w', info)

inf = pd.DataFrame(info, index = range(1))
inf.to_csv(simOutFileName, index = False, mode = "a",
header= False)
df1.to_csv(simOutFileName, index = False, mode = "a")
x += 1
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else:
df1.to_csv(simOutFileName, index = False, mode = "a",
header= False)

temp = currentTrustVector[actor]
k = temp.keys()
#for k in temp:
print(", ".join(k))
print()
val = []
for k, v in temp.items():
val.append(str(v))
print(", ".join(val))

data = currentTrustVector[actor]
key = []
val = []
for k, v in data.items():
key.append(k)
pad = (len(k)- len(str(v)) ) * ' '
val.append(pad + str(v))
print(','.join(key))
print(','.join(val))
#

for element in printActor:

70

def printClean():
for K,V in currentTrustVector.items():
print()
#prints actor
print(K)

#prints dicts associated with actor
for k,v in V.items():
print(k,":",v)

def Time():
global TIME
TIME = TIME + TIMESTAMP
return float(TIME)

'''
this function is in charge of calculating the core MVoT
values. It includes TS, C, DS, CommFreq, TSLC, TX time
and avg_TX
'''

def calculation(current_row):
actor = current_row[0]

global n_AvgTX
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n_AvgTX+= 1
global n_SDTT
n_SDTT+= 1
print("n_AvgTX", n_AvgTX)
print(actor)

#update old trust vector
oldTrustVector[actor]['certainty'] =
currentTrustVector[actor]['certainty']

oldTrustVector[actor]["trust score"] =
currentTrustVector[actor]["trust score"]

oldTrustVector[actor]["unexpected message count"] =
currentTrustVector[actor]["unexpected message count"]

oldTrustVector[actor]["average transit time"] =
currentTrustVector[actor]["average transit time"]

#calculate trust score
msgRatio = currentTrustVector[actor]
["expected message count"] (ALPHA * currentTrustVector[actor]
["unexpected message count"])
print("old certainty")
print(ALPHA, "ALPHA")
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print(oldTrustVector[actor]["certainty"])
currentTrustVector[actor]["trust score"] =
msgRatio * currentTrustVector[actor]["certainty"]

#calculate communication frequency

print(currentTrustVector[actor]["registration date"],
"currentTrustVector[actor]['registration date']")
we = time.time()

if((float(current_row[2]) - currentTrustVector[actor]
["registration date"]) == 0):
currentTrustVector[actor]["communication frequency"] =
0.001
else:
currentTrustVector[actor]["communication frequency"] =
((currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"])/
((currentTrustVector[actor]["time stamp"] currentTrustVector[actor]["registration date"])))
print("comm freq", currentTrustVector[actor]
["communication frequency"])

#calculate relative factor of certainty

(RFC)

print("expected message count", currentTrustVector[actor]
["expected message count"])
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print("total message count",currentTrustVector[actor]
["total message count"])
currentTrustVector[actor]["relative factor of certainty"] =
abs(
(currentTrustVector[actor]["expected message count"] /
currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"]) - .5 )
* BETA

#calculate certainty
if (not currentTrustVector[actor]
["time since last communication"] <= 0):
currentTrustVector[actor]["certainty"] = (
currentTrustVector[actor]["relative factor of certainty"]
* (1 - math.exp(-GAMMA *
currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"])) *
(currentTrustVector[actor]["communication
frequency"]/ACTOR_MAX_COMMFREQ[actor]) *
(ACTOR_MIN_TSLC[actor]/
(currentTrustVector[actor]
["time since last communication"])))
if (currentTrustVector[actor]["certainty"] == 0):
currentTrustVector[actor]["certainty"] = 0.1

print(actor)
print((1 - math.exp(-GAMMA *
currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"])),

74

"Gamma")

#calculate distrust
currentTrustVector[actor]["distrust score"] =
oldTrustVector[actor]["unexpected message count"] *
currentTrustVector[actor]["certainty"]

print(currentTrustVector[actor]["distrust score"],
"currentTrustVector[actor]['distrust score']")

#average transit time
currentTrustVector[actor]["average transit time"] =
((currentTrustVector[actor]["message transit time"] +
n_AvgTX * oldTrustVector[actor]["average transit time"])/
(n_AvgTX + 1))

#standard deviation transit time
SD = ((n_SDTT * oldTrustVector[actor]
["SD transit time"] ** 2 +
(currentTrustVector[actor]["message transit time"] oldTrustVector[actor]["average transit time"]) *

currentTrustVector[actor]["message transit time"] currentTrustVector[actor]["average transit time"]) /
n_SDTT)
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print(currentTrustVector[actor]["total message count"], "MSG CNT")
print(oldTrustVector[actor]["SD transit time"] ** 2, "SDTT ^2")
print(currentTrustVector[actor]["message transit time"], "MSG TX")
print(currentTrustVector[actor]["average transit time"], "AVG TX")
print(SD, " SD")
SD = abs(SD)
currentTrustVector[actor]["SD transit time"] = math.sqrt(SD)
#calculate relative factor of transit time
'''
if (abs(currentTrustVector[actor]
["average tranist time"] - currentTrustVector[actor]
["message tranist time"]) >
abs(DELTA * currentTrustVector[actor]
["SD transit time"])):
print("BAD")
'''

if (pathlib.Path(args.file).exists() == True):
with open(args.file, mode='r') as csvFile:
fileReader = csv.reader(csvFile)
count = 0
x = 0
for row in fileReader:
if (count > 0):
#update message counters
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messageCount(row)
#timekeeping new message
#print(oldTrustVector)
timeKeeping(row)

if (args.equation == "v1"):
#calculate MVoT
calculation(row)
#generate response
response(row)
#write to output csv file
printToCSV(row,x)
x += 1
#response(row)

if (args.debug == 'y'):
input("Press Enter to continue...")
count += 1
print("count", count)
printClean()
print()
print(currentTrustVector)

else:
print("File does not exist")
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